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THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
MICHAEL CKUGG, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Civil No, 870308-CA 
REPLY OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction herein conferred upon the Court of Appeals by 
Rule 3(a) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Utah Court of Appeals, 
Article VIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution and Section 78-
4-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT SHOWING THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the judgment rendered by the 
Honorable David W, Sorenson of the Second Circuit Court of the 
State of Utah, for Cache County, Logan City Department. A trial 
was held regarding the above-stated matter on July 6, 1987, and 
the defendant's motion for dismissal after the appellant had 
completed its case was granted by the Court. The defendant was 
tried for being in physical control of a motor vehicle in 
violation of Section 41-6-44(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. On the 6th day of July, 1987, the above case was 
presented to the judge without a jury. Appellant seeks reversal 
of the Circuit Court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
The appellant responds to the issues stated by the 
respondent in response: 
1. That there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was driving or operating a 
vehicle upon the highways of the State of Utah. 
2. That there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was in actual physical 
control as required by statute. 
3. That there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was under the influence so as 
to be incapable of operating a vehicle safely. 
4. That there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did fall within the exception 
of State of Utah v. Buggar, 483 P. 2d 442 (1971). 
5. That there was sufficient evidence to establish corpus 
delicti. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
I. Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44 (1953 as amended), 
2o Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-11 (1953 as amended). 
3. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(1). 
4. Lopez v. Schwendimanr 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986). 
5. Schwendiman v. Garcia, 645 P. 2d 651. 
6. State of Utah v. Buggar, 483 P.2d 442 (1971). 
7. State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). 
8. State v. Tucker, 709 P. 2d 313 (Utah 1985). 
9. State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah 1977). 
10. People v. Garcia, 197 Cal.Rptr, 277 (1983). 
II. Oregon v. Smith, 570 P.2d 409 (Or. 1977). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the early morning hours of June 5, 1987, Officer Joe Yonk 
and Officer Spence Anderson were on routine patrol in the Hyrum, 
Utah, area. The officers were traveling westbound on the west 
side of the Hyrum Dam when they observed a yellow Ford Maverick 
parked off the shoulder of the road approximately two to three 
feet (TR p. 5). The officers observed an individual behind the 
wheel with his head leaning toward the window (TR p. 36). 
The officers pulled behind and to the side of the Ford 
Maverick and Officer Anderson, who was a passenger in the patrol 
vehicle, went to the Ford Maverick to check on the condition of 
the driver (TR pp. 5, 37). The driver was awake and behind the 
wheel, the keys were in the ignition of the vehicle, and the 
officer noticed signs of impairment as he talked to the 
Respondent, Michael Chugg, and could smell and odor of alcohol 
coming from his breath (TR pp. 5, 6, 12, 22, 23, 40, 44). The 
officers also noticed that the speech of the Respondent was slow 
and not normal (TR p. 40). Officer Anderson had the suspect exit 
the vehicle noticing that the Respondent appeared to be very 
unstable (TR p. 40). The suspect moved to the front of the 
patrol car where the officer proceeded to administer several 
field sobriety tests (TR p. 6). 
While the officer was administering the field sobriety 
tests, Officer Yonk exited the vehicle, walked over to the 
suspect's vehicle, and observed the keys in the ignition (TR p. 
44). At this time Officer Anderson requested the Respondent 
perform three field sobriety tests (TR p. 6). The first test 
performed was that of that horizontal gaze nystagmus (TR p. 7). 
The officer explained this test to the Respondent (TR p. 8). The 
officer then stated that the Respondent's eyes lacked that of 
smooth pursuit in both eyes and his eyes jerked at maximum 
deviation (TR p. 8). 
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The next test requested to be performed by the Respondent 
was that of the walk and turn test (TR p. 9). The officer 
explained this test to the Respondent and asked him if he 
understood it (TR p. 10). He replied that he did (TR pp. 8, 10). 
The officer indicated that the Respondent was unable to place his 
right foot in front of his left foot and to perform the walk and 
turn test (TR pp. 9, 10). The officer also stated that the 
Respondent was very unstable on his feet and swayed back and 
forth as well as side to side (TR p. 10). 
The third field sobriety test the Respondent was requested 
to perform was that of the one leg stand and balance (TR p. 10). 
The officer demonstrated this test and asked the Respondent if he 
understood it and the Respondent responded that he did (TR p. 
11). The officer observed that the Respondent could not lift his 
foot off the ground for more than two seconds (TR p. 11). The 
Respondent tried to count, keeping his toes on the ground 
contrary to the instructions given by the officer (TR p.11). 
After the field sobriety tests, officer Anderson placed the 
Respondent under arrest for being in physical control of a 
vehicle while intoxicated pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 41-6-44(1), (1953, as amended) (TR pp. 12, 13, 14). The 
defendant told the officers that he had been drinking on two 
occasions (TR pp. 16, 19, 20). The Respondent stated that he 
thought he was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage 
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according to the results of the intoxilyzer test results (TR p. 
20). 
Officer Joe Yonk observed two of the field sobriety tests 
that were being administered by Officer Anderson, the heel to toe 
and the balance test (TR pp. 37, 38). Officer Yonk also 
testified that the Respondent was unable to perform either test 
(TR p. 39). Also in Court both officers testified that the 
Respondent was obviously intoxicated and definitely under the 
influence of an alcoholic beverage (TR p. 39). The Respondent 
was transferred to the Cache County Jail for the taking of a 
breath test (TR pp. 14, 39, 40). The breath test was taken; 
however, at the time of trial, the expert witness on the 
intoxilyzer was unavailable (TR pp. 49-50). Also, the 
intoxilyzer certificate for the period of time after the taking 
of the breath sample from the Respondent had not yet been 
prepared. The Court indicated, in its findings, that because 
intoxilyzer samples had not been admitted into evidence, 
indicating the blood alcohol, content that it could not find that 
the Respondent was in physical control of a vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol (TR pp.58, 59, 61). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The first issue of the Respondent is disposed of pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 41-6-ll(b) (1953 as amended), and 
according to Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44 et al, in that 
operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State of Utah 
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is not an element of DUI. An operator in an intoxicated 
condition who is unable to operate a vehicle safely may be 
arrested under the statutory provisions stated supra anywhere 
within the State of Utah. 
As pertaining to Issue Two the Circuit Court found in its 
findings that the defendant was in actual physical control as 
required by statute. 
As pertaining to Issue Three the State would refer the 
Honorable Court back to its argument in the appellant's brief. 
The Court held as pertaining to the respondents Issue Four 
that the defendant was in control of the motor vehicle. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(1), and 
according to case law, the Defendant may not bring up new issues 
on appeal when there has not been an objection in the lower 
court. As pertaining the issue of corpus delicti there was no 
objection made in the lower court. However, the State would also 
indicate that there was a prima facie showing sufficient to 
establish corpus delicti in bringing in the admission of the 
defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED TO SHOW THAT THE VEHICLE WAS 
BEING OPERATED UPON THE HIGHWAYS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 41-6-44, (1953 AS AMENDED). 
The legislature has held in Utah Code Annotated Section 41-
6-11(b) (1953 as amended) that in order for a jury or court to 
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find a defendant guilty of violating the Driving Under the 
Influence section of the Codef .Section 41-6-44 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended), that the violation happened in the 
State of Utah not limiting the violation to public highways. 
Section 41-6-11 the Utah Code states: 
"The provisions of this chapter relating to the 
operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the 
operation of vehicles upon highways, except: 
(1) where a different place is specifically referred 
to in a given section; or 
(2) under the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5 and 
Sections 41-6-29 to 41-6-45 inclusive, which apply upon 
highways and elsewhere throughout the state." 
Also under Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44(1)(a) (1953 as amended) it 
reads: 
"(l)(a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person to operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol content of .08% or 
greater by weight as shown by a chemical test given 
within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control, or if the person is under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which 
renders the person incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle." (Emphasis Added). 
Both sections of Utah Code Annotated clearly indicate that the 
operation of a motor vehicle under the Section which the 
defendant has been charged does not require that said operation 
be upon the highways of the State of Utah. 
POINT TOO 
WAS THE RESPONDENT IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL AS 
REQUIRED BY STATUTE. 
The Honorable Judge Sorenson held that at this point in time 
the defendant was driving the vehicle. The court stated: 
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"If you look at Lopez and Garcia, and those particular 
cases, I think our Supreme Court since Tuckett gave 
this even his dissent — or not Tuckett, but Elliott, 
gave his dissent in the Buggar case, the Supreme Court 
has probably broadened what it had announced in Buggar. 
But in this particular case, what the Court sees and 
has heard, at least the testimony at this point in 
time, there is no doubt that the defendant was driving 
the vehicle. We have a contradiction of terms between 
the officers as to actually what they observed or what 
was when they came up to the case." 
It is apparent from the decision of the lower court that the 
respondent was found to be in control of the motor vehicle. 
However, assuming for argument purposes the court is inclined to 
hear and discuss this issue on appeal the State would refer to 
the cases which it cited in the Brief of Appellant more 
specifically Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986) and 
Schwendiman v. Garcia 645 P.2d 651, those cases coupled with the 
facts that were presented to the Court would indicate that the 
defendant was in physical control of the motor vehicle. He was 
behind the wheel, he was awake, and the keys were in the ignition 
of the vehicle. The vehicle was parked along the side of the 
roadway. The Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have 
expanded State of Utah v. Buggar, 483 P.2d 442 (1971), and the 
controlling cases relating to the fact as presented to the Court 
would indicate that Buggar, supra is not controlling in this 
matter because the defendant was not asleep. However, the 
appellant would also argue that the analysis in Buggar, supra, in 
regards to physical control would also substantiate that the 
respondent should have been found and was found to be in physical 
control of the motor vehicle. 
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POINT THREE 
WAS IT IMPROPER TO USE THE DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION TO 
PROVE THE CORPUS DELICTI. 
A review of the transcript indicates that the Respondent 
never made an objection on the basis of corpus delicti or the use 
of the defendant's admission at trial. When the question was 
asked at the trial court level neither the respondent or his 
counsel placed an objection on the record and therefore, it 
cannot now be raised for the first time on appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. McCardell, 652 
P. 2d 942 at 947 (Utah 1982): 
"We endorse the following statement by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in that case: 'The contemporaryness 
objectional law adhered to in the State requires timely 
and specific objections to admission of evidence on 
order for the question of admissability to be 
considered upon appeal. The rule a salutary procedural 
tool serving the legitimate state purpose. By making 
the use of the rule, counsel gives trial court the 
opportunity to conduct a trial without using the 
tainted evidence, and thus avoid possible reversal and 
a new trial. Furthermore, the rule is practically one 
of necessity if litigation is ever to be brought to an 
end." 
Also, in the case of State v. Tucker, 709 P. 2d 313 at 315 (Utah 
1985), the Supreme Court stated: 
"Under the contemporaneous objection rule, if the trial 
court objection does not direct the court's attention 
to a legal point being raised upon appeal, we cannot 
consider it for the first time on appeal." 
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(1), it states: 
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless the substantial rights of 
the party is effected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, timely objection or motion to strike appears 
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of record stating the specific grounds of objection, if the 
specific grounds v/as not apparent from the context: or..eff 
It is apparent from a review of the record that an objection was 
never made as to corpus delicti* However, assuming for argument 
purposes the court is inclined to hear the issue, the appellant 
would point out that the evidence given by the two officers as 
stated in the facts listed supra, indicate a prima facie showing 
of the elements of driving while impaired and that the admission 
of the defendant is admissible based upon the evidence that the 
Court heard. The appellant is only required to present a prima 
facie showing before the statement of the defendant may be used 
against him in a court of law. See State v. Knoefler, 563 P. 2d 
175 (Utah 1977), People v. Garcia, 197 Cal.Rptr. 277, (1983), and 
Oregon v. Smith, 57- P. 2d 409 (Or. 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments made by the respondent are frivolous and have 
no merit in this appeal. By statute a person may be arrested and 
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol while 
impaired anywhere in the State of Utah. The defendant v/as found 
by the court to be in physical control of the motor vehicle and 
the facts according to the recent case law also indicate the 
same. Two officers testified at court without rebuttal that in 
their opinion the respondent was under the influence of an 
intoxicating substance. It is also apparent that under the new 
case law cited supra, and according to the facts that the 
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defendant was not asleep but awake and Buggar, supra, would not 
be controlling. 
The respondent has failed to make an objection in the lower 
court concerning the corpus delicti argument and should be barred 
from making the argument in the Court of Appeals. 
DATED this /?& day of November, 198 7. 
,rR" Eurbank 
Cache County Attorney. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing RESPONSE BRIEF to C. DeMont Judd, Attorney for 
Defendant, at 2650 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
>j^S> A)t DATED t h i s /?*& day of September, 1987 ep-
"R" BTJRBANK 
Cache County Attorney 
ey for the State of Utah 
ADDENDUM 
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consider whether and under what circum-
stances recusal may be required in adminis-
trative adjudications when the specific pro-
visions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply. 
Plainly, having participated in a rule mak-
ing proceeding does not automatically pre-
clude a commissioner from participating in 
a later, properly conducted adjudication. 
We have considered the other issues 
raised and find their disposition unneces-
sary to the result. The Commission's rule 
is of no force and effect, and its order is 
vacated. The matter is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Fred C. SCHWENDIMA*J, Chief, Driver 
License Services, Utah Department of 
Public Safety, Defendant and Respon-
dent. 
No. 20112. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 1986. 
Utah State Driver License Division re-
voked driving privileges of driver for peri-
od of one year. The Seventh District 
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. David-
son, J., affirmed the administrative deci-
sion. Driver appealed. The Supreme 
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for 
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs was intended by legislature 
to protect public safety and apprehend 
drunken driver before he or she strikes and 
may not be construed to exclude those 
whose vehicles are presently immobile be-
cause of mechanical trouble, and (2) driv-
er's refusal to submit to breath test upon 
rumors that there had been incidents of 
tampering with breathalyzer in the past 
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting de-
fendant to license revocation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles <3=>144.2(9) 
In revocation proceeding, Driver Divi-
sion has burden to show that operator of 
vehicle was in actual physical control of 
motor vehicle and that arresting officer 
had grounds to believe that operator was 
under influence of alcohol. 
2. Automobiles <s=>144.2(10) 
In trial de novo, district court must 
determine by preponderance of evidence 
whether driver's license was subject to rev-
ocation for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10. 
3. Automobiles <3=>144.2(3) 
Supreme Court's review of district 
court's determination as to whether driv-
er's license was subject to revocation for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol 
is deferential to trial court's view of evi-
dence unless trial court has misapplied 
principles of law or its findings are clearly 
against weight of evidence. 
4. Automobiles 0=^144.1(1) 
Even if truck was inoperable at time 
that licensee was found sleeping in it and 
arrested, that would not preclude him from 
having "actual physical control" over truck 
so that his driver's license could be revoked 
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alco-
hol content. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2). 
5. Automobiles <3=>349 
Statute providing for arrest of one "m 
actual physical control" of vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs 
was intended by legislature to protect pub-
lic safety and apprehend drunken driver 
before he or she strikes and may not be 
construed to exclude those vehicles are 
presently immobile because of mechanics 
LOPEZ v. SCHWENDIMAN 
Cite a* 720 p-** 778 (Utah 1986) 
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trouble. U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19.5, 41-6-44-" 
10(2). 
g. Automobiles <s=*144.2(10) 
District court's findings that vehicle 
had reached its point of rest under its oWn 
power and that licensee had failed fiel^ 
sobriety test, were supported by competed 
evidence, and would not be disturbed bv 
Supreme Court. 
7. Automobiles <$=>144.1(1) 
Refusal to take breathalyzer test sirt1" 
ply means that arrestee was asked to take 
breath test decline to do so of his own 
volition. 
8. Automobiles <3=>144.2(8) 
Whether or not driver's refusal to take 
breath test is conditional or reasonab)e 
makes no difference; result is still license 
revocation of one year. U.C.A.1953, 41-6" 
9. Automobiles ^144.1(1) 
Refusal to answer yes or no to request 
to taking breath test is still refusal, for 
purpose of license revocation. U.C.A* 
1953, 41-6-44.10. 
10. Automobiles @=*144.1(1) 
Driver's licensee admitted that he h-^ 
been requested to submit to breath te^ 
and that he had refused, invoking sanction 
of revocation of his license. U.C.A. 195& 
41-6-44.10. 
11. Appeal and Error <3=»181 
Supreme Court will not review allege^ 
Tor when no objection at all is made 0* 
ial level. 
Phil L. Hansen, (Lopez), Salt Lake City* 
r plaintiff and a^jellaut. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M-
Ale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
efendant and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
The Utah State Driver License Division 
evoked the driving privileges of petition^1* 
°pez for a period of one year pursuant to 
•C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.10 (1981 ed.). Af-
ter a trial de novo, the trial court affirmed 
the administrative decision. Lopez appeals 
and contends: (1) it was error to find that 
Lopez was in actual physical control of his 
vehicle when he was asleep at the wheel 
and the vehicle was inoperable; (2) his re-
fusal to take a breath test was reasonable; 
and (3) it was error to allow testimony on 
Lopez's breath test refusal when Lopez did 
not know that he was under arrest. We 
affirm. 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on March 18, 
1984, Officers Anderson and Schofield 
were separately dispatched to investigate a 
prowler report. En route, Schofield was 
flagged down by an individual who pointed 
to Lopez's truck parked by a public tele-
phone booth adjacent to Sunnyside City 
Hall. The truck's motor was not running. 
There were vehicle tracks from the pickup 
in the freshly fallen snow. When Schofield 
approached the truck, Lopez was sitting in 
the driver's seat with his head resting on 
the steering wheel. Schofield tapped on 
the window, assisted Lopez in opening the 
door to talk to him, and had to catch him 
when he fell more than stepped out of his 
truck. Schofield smelled alcohol on Lo-
pez's breath. Lopez was drooling, had 
very poor balance, and needed support to 
stand. When asked to produce a driver 
license, Lopez initially handed the officer a 
child's picture. Schofield removed the keys 
from the ignition and had to turn them to 
get them out. 
After Officer Anderson arrived, both of-
ficers asked Lopez to perform several field 
sobriety tests, which he failed. Lopez at 
one point stated, "Was I driving, I was just 
waiting for a phone call." Lopez was 
placed under arrest, handcuffed, and 
jJiacea "m tne paYnft cur. l^otn oYncexs "tes-
tified that Lopez asked several times what 
he was arrested for. Officer Anderson 
then requested Lopez to submit to a breath 
test to determine the alcohol content in his 
blood. Lopez responded, "I took your 
tests. I passed your tests." Lopez was 
transported to the sheriffs station, where 
he was again asked to submit to the breath 
test, was advised that he would be permit-
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ted to have an additional test administered 
by a physician of his own choice, and was 
warned that his refusal to submit to the 
test could result in revocation of his license 
for one year. Lopez did not respond. 
At trial, Lopez stated for the first time 
that his wife had been driving the truck 
when the battery died. He had been wait-
ing in the truck for her to bring the car to 
tow the truck home. He admitted that he 
had not told the officers about any dead 
battery or dead car. He admitted that he 
understood that he had been arrested for 
driving while under the influence. Lopez 
also testified that he had refused the offi-
cer's request to take the breath test be-
cause he "didn't trust them" and that he 
had conducted the field sobriety tests well 
enough to prove that he had not been 
drinking. He also confirmed that he had 
been told that he would lose his license if 
he refused. 
From the evidence so adduced, the trial 
court found by a preponderance that there 
was probable cause to arrest Lopez, that he 
had been requested to take the breath test, 
and that he had been warned of the conse-
quences if there was a refusal. The court 
found the arrest proper because Lopez was 
alone in the car, had the keys to the ve-
hicle, "there were tire tracks leading up to 
the vehicle, the vehicle got there apparent-
ly on its own power," and Lopez had failed 
the field sobriety tests. 
[1-3] In a revocation proceeding, the 
Driver License Division has the burden to 
show that the operator of a vehicle was "in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle" 
and that the arresting officer had grounds 
to believe that the operator was then under 
the influence of alcohol. Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah 
1982); Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302 
(Utah 1979). In a trial de novo, the district 
court must determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence "whether the petitioner's 
license is subject to revocation under the 
provisions of this chapter." § 41-6-44.-
10(2), supra; Garcia, 645 P.2d at 652. Our 
review of that determination is deferential 
to the trial court's view of the evidence 
unless the trial court has misapplied princi-
ples of law or its findings are clearly 
against the weight of the evidence. Id
 a^ 
653. 
Lopez first argues that the Driver Li-
cense Division failed to meet the statutory 
requirements that he had "actual physical 
control" of the vehicle when he was arrest-
ed. Section 41-6-44.10(1) reads in perti-
nent part: 
Any person operating a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given 
his consent to a chemical test or tests of 
his breath, blood, or urine for the pur-
pose of determining whether he was driv-
ing or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having a blood alco-
hol content statutorily prohibited, or 
while under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or combination of alcohol and any 
drug . . . so long as the test is or tests 
are administered at the direction of a 
peace officer having grounds to believe 
that person to have been driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood alcohol content stat-
utorily prohibited, or while under the in-
fluence of alcohol, any drug, or combina-
tion of alcohol and any drug 
Lopez compares his situation to the facts 
of State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 
P.2d 442 (1971), where the driver of the 
vehicle had parked his car completely off 
the road, had turned off the motor, and 
was sleeping. Nothing in that case indi-
cates that the driver was in the driver's 
seat at the time he was found and arrested. 
"Positioning in the driver's seat is an ele-
ment common to all of the cases that have 
found actual physical control of a motion-
less vehicle." State v. Smelter, 36 Wash. 
App. 439, 674 P.2d 690 (1984). See also 
Adams v. State, 697 P.2d 622 (Wyo.1985); 
Huges v. State, 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla.Crim. 
1975); but compare Bearden v. State, 430 
P.2d 844 (Okla.Crim.1967), where the driver 
lay unconscious on the ground beside his 
pickup truck. The courts upholding convic-
tions in these and similar fact situations 
start out from the premise that as long as 
a person is physically able to assert domin-
LOPEZ v. SCHWENDIMAN 
Cite a* 720 P^d 778 (Utah 1986) 
ion by starting the car and driving away, at 654; accord Ballard 
Utah 781 
he has substantially as much control over 
the vehicle as he would if he were actually 
driving it. Adams v. State, 697 P.2d at 
625. 
[4,5] Nonetheless, Lopez claims that 
his car was inoperable at the time of his 
arrest and that the statutory burden was 
therefore not borne by the Driver License 
Division as he was unable to start the car 
and drive it away. We note initially that 
Lopez first told this version of the events 
leading to his arrest when he took the 
stand in his trial de novo. No substantiat-
ing evidence was offered to buttress his 
assertion. Under the circumstances, the 
trial court may well have disbelieved him 
and given little weight to his testimony. 
Assuming arguendo that Lopez's truck 
was indeed disabled, jurisdictions with sim-
ilar statutes as ours have nonetheless 
found "actual physical control" of the driv-
er over the disabled car. The rationale was 
forcefully voiced in State v. Smelter, 674 
P.2d at 693: 
The focus should not be narrowly upon 
the mechanical condition of the car when 
it comes to rest, but upon the status of 
its occupant and the nature of the au-
thority he or she exerted over the vehicle 
in arriving at the place from which, by 
virtue of its inoperability, it can no long-
er move. Where, as here, circumstantial 
evidence permits a legitimate inference 
that the car was where it was and was 
performing as it was because of the de-
fendant's choice, it follows that the de-
fendant was in actual physical control. 
To hold otherwise could conceivably al-
low an intoxicated driver whose vehicle 
was rendered inoperable in a collision to 
escape prosecution. 
Citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 237 Pa. 
Super.212, 352 A.2d 137 (1975). Utah's 
statute provides for the arrest of one "in 
actual physical control" of the vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or 
d
™gs. That requirement was intended by 
°ur legislature to protect public safety and 
apprehend the drunken driver before he or 
she strikes, § 41-2-19.5; Garcia, 645 P.2d 
v. State, supra, 
and may not be construed to exclude those 
whose vehicles are presently immobile be-
cause of mechanical trouble. State v. 
Smelter, supra. 
[6] The trial court here found that 
there were tire tracks leading up to the 
vehicle, that the vehicle had to have 
reached its point of rest "apparently on its 
own power," and that Lopez had failed the 
field sobriety tests. Those findings are 
supported by competent evidence and will 
not be disturbed by this Court. 
[7-10] At trial, Lopez based his refusal 
to submit to a breath test upon the rumors 
that there had been incidents of tampering 
with the breathalyzer in the past. His 
retort to the officers at the scene was that 
he had taken the tests and passed them. A 
refusal simply means that an arrestee who 
is asked to take a breath test "declines to 
do so of his own volition." Cavaness v. 
Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). Whether or 
not that refusal is conditional makes no 
difference. Id. Likewise, it makes no dif-
ference whether or not a refusal is reason-
able. The result is still a license revocation 
of one year. By the same token, a refusal 
to answer yes or no to a request to take a 
breath test is still a refusal. Beck v. Cox, 
597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979). Lopez admitted 
that he had been requested to submit to the 
test and that he had refused. No more 
was required to invoke the sanction of the 
statute. § 41-6-44.10(2), supra. 
[11] We do not reach the merits of Lo-
pez's claim that testimony on his refusal to 
take the breath test was inadmissible be-
cause he was not aware that he was under 
arrest. Lopez's counsel did not object, but 
actively solicited that testimony from Lo-
pez on cross-examination. This Court will 
not review alleged error when no objection 
at all is made at the trial level. State v. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). 
The judgment is affirmed. 
! KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
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den. In that case, however, the trial court 
dismissed the robbery charge on its own 
volition. That is not the case here. 
The District Attorney's office, an arm 
of the state, and under the direct super-
vision of the Attorney General (67-5-1), 
that is appealing here,—a somewhat un-
orthodox and inconsistent circumstance,— 
made the motion to dismiss the action, 
which at that point was as much an issue 
as Combs* restraint of liberty. It would 
seem that before this court orders the 
trial court to do much of anything the 
matter of that motion to dismiss and the 
resulting dismissal, all for a presumably 
good cause, should be resolved. 
In addition to the position I take on the 
aspect of this case reflected in the para-
graph immediately above, I urge that per-
haps we made a mistake in the remand 
portion of the McGuffey case and that we 
should overrule that part of it. The in-
stant case itself seems to point up the ad-
visability of so doing. To do anything 
more could lead us on safari in a civil 
proceeding down a road into an erstwhile 
juristic jungle of no return. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
25 Utah 2d 404 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Charles BUGGER, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 12278. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 6, 1971. 
Defendant was convicted in the Second 
District Court, Davis County, Thornley K. 
Swan, J., of being in actual physical con-
trol of his vehicle while under influence 
of intoxicating liquor, and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that 
defendant who was asleep in his automo-
bile which was completely off traveled por-
tion of highway and whose motor was not 
running at time investigating officer 
awakened defendant and detected smell of 
alcohol was not in "actual physical control 
of any vehicle" in violation of statute 
proscribing such behavior at time of his 
arrest. 
Reversed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
Automobiles <§=>332 
Defendant who was asleep in his auto-
mobile which was completely off traveled 
portion of highway and whose motor was 
not running at time investigating officer 
awakened defendant and detected smell of 
alcohol was not in "actual physical control 
of any vehicle'* in violation of statute 
proscribing such behavior at time of his 
arrest. U.C.A.19S3, 41-6-44. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Robert Van Sciver, Van Sciver, Flor-
ence, Hutchison & Sharp, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant-appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren 
N. Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff-respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice-
The defendant was found guilty of a 
violation of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A.1953, 
and from that conviction he has appealed 
to this court. 
During the night of July 28, 1969, the 
defendant was asleep in his automobile 
which was parked upon the shoulder of a 
road known as Tippet's Lane in Davis 
County. The automobile was completely 
off the traveled portion of the highway 
and the motor was not running. An officer 
of the Highway Patrol stopped at the scene 
and discovered the defendant was asleep. 
With some effort the officer succeeded in 
awakening the defendant, at which time the 
officer detected the smell of alcohol and 
rested the defendant i 
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Utah 443 
arrested the defendant for being in actual 
physical control of the vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
The complaint charges the defendant 
with the violation of the statute above re-
ferred to which provides as follows: 
It is unlawful and punishable as pro-
vided in subsection (d) of this section 
for any person who is under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be 
in actual physical control of any vehicle 
within this state. 
The defendant is here challenging the 
validity of the statute on the grounds of 
vagueness. However, we need not decide 
the case upon that ground. That part of 
the statute which states: "be in actual phys-
ical control of any vehicle" has been be-
fore the courts of other jurisdictions which 
have statutes with similar wordings. The 
word "actual" has been defined as mean-
ing "existing in act or reality; * * * in 
action or existence at the time being; 
present; * * *." The word "physical" 
is defined as "bodily," and "control" is de-
fined as "to exercise restraining or direct-
ing influence over; to dominate; regulate; 
hence, to hold from actions; to curb." 
The term in "actual physical control" in 
its ordinary sense means "existing" or 
"present bodily restraint, directing influ-
ence, domination or regulation." l It is 
clear that in the record before us the facts 
do not bring the case within the wording 
of the statute. The defendant at the time 
of his arrest was not controlling the ve-
hicle, nor was he exercising any dominion 
over it. It is noted that the cases cited by 
the plaintiff in support of its position in 
this matter deal with entirely different fact 
situations, such as the case where the driver 
was seated in his vehicle on the traveled 
portion of the highway; or where the mo-
tor of the vehicle was operating;, or where 
the driver was attempting to steer the auto-
mobile while it was in motion; or where 
I. State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 
338; State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 
321 P.2d 615; Ohio v. Wilgus, Com.Pl., 
he was attempting to brake the vehicle to 
arrest its motion. 
We are of the opinion that the facts in 
this case do not make out a violation of 
the statute and the defendant's conviction 
is reversed. We do not consider it neces-
sary to discuss the other claimed errors 
raised by the defendant. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and HENRIOD 
and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
The statute formerly made it unlawful 
for a person under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor to drive any vehicle upon any 
highway within this state.1 The amendment 
added a provision making it unlawful to 
be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. It removed the need to be upon a 
highway before the crime was made out 
and did away with the necessity of driving 
before a crime was committed. 
The reason for the change is obvious. 
It is better to prevent an intoxicated person 
in charge of an automobile from getting 
on the highway than it is to punish him 
after he gets on it. The amended statute 
gives officers a right to arrest a drunk 
person in the control of an automobile and 
thus prevent him from wreaking havoc 
a minute later by getting in traffic, or from 
injuring himself by his erratic driving. 
It does not matter whether the motor 
is running or is idle nor whether the drunk 
is in the front seat or in the back seat. 
His potentiality for harm is lessened but 
not obviated by a silent motor or a back-
seat position—provided, of course, that he 
is the one in control of the car. It only 
takes a flick of the wrist to start the motor 
or to engage the gears, and it requires only 
a moment of time to get under the wheel 
from the back seat. A drunk in control 
17 Ohio Supp. 34; Parker v. State (Okl. 
Cr.App.), 424 P.2d 997; 47 A.L.R.2d 582. 
I. Sec. 57-7-14, R.S.U.1933. 
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of a motor vehicle has such a propensity 
to cause harm that the statute intended to 
make it criminal for him to be in a position 
to do so. 
Restraining the movement of a vehicle 
is controlling it as much as moving it is. 
A person finding a drunk in the back seat 
of a car parked in one's driveway is likely 
to learn who is in control of that car if 
he should attempt to move it. A drunk 
may maliciously block one's exit, and in 
doing so he is in control of his own vehicle. 
I think the defendant in this case was in 
control of his truck within the meaning of 
the statute even though he may have been 
asleep. He had the key and was the only 
one who could drive it. The fact that he 
chose to park it is no reason to say he was 
not in control thereof. 
I, therefore, think that we should con-
sider the question which he raises in his 
brief as to the validity of the statute. 
Cases wherein an attack was made on 
statutes like ours have been decided in a 
number of jurisdictions. They hold the 
statute good. 
In the case of State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 
8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954), the defendant was 
intoxicated and asleep in a truck parked 
next to some barricades in a lane of traf-
fic. An officer passed by and observed 
no one in the car. Later he returned and 
found the defendant "passed out." The 
statute made it a crime to be in actual 
physical control of a car while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. The de-
fendant contended that the wording of the 
statute was not meant to apply to a situa-
tion where the car was parked and that it 
was only concerned with the driving of an 
automobile and other acts and conduct of a 
positive nature. In holding that the statute 
was applicable to the conduct of the defend-
ant, the court said: 
An intoxicated person seated behind 
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is 
a threat to the safety and welfare of 
the public. The danger is less than that 
involved when the vehicle is actually 
moving, but it does exist. 
In the case of Parker v. State, 424 P.2d 
997 (Okl.Cr.App.1967), the appellant chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a statute 
making it unlawful for "any person who is 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
to drive, operate, or be in actual physical 
control of any motor vehicle within this 
state." There the defendant (appellant) 
claimed that the statute was unconstitu-
tional in that it was so vague and indefinite 
that a person charged thereunder would be 
deprived of due process of law. The court 
held that the statute did not violate any 
of appellant's constitutional rights. 
Under a similar statute the Montana Su-
preme Court in State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 
243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958), held that the 
statute was not void for vagueness, and in 
doing so said: 
* * * Thus one could have "actual 
physical control" while merely parking 
or standing still so long as one was 
keeping the car in restraint or in posi-
tion to regulate its movements. Prevent-
ing a car from moving is as much control 
and dominion as actually putting the car 
in motion on the highway. Could one 
exercise any more regulation over a 
thing, while bodily present, than preven-
tion of movement or curbing movement. 
As long as one were physically or bodily 
able to assert dominion, in the sense of 
movement, then he has as much control 
over an object as he would if he were 
actually driving the vehicle. 
* * * * * * 
* * * [I]t is quite evident that the 
statute in the instant case is neither 
vague nor uncertain. * * * 
The appellant here claims some federally 
protected rights in that he says he was im-
properly arrested. It is difficult for me to 
see where that has anything to do with 
guilt or innocence. If he were improperly 
arrested, he would have an action against 
the officer for false arrest, but surely our 
courts have not lost contact with reality 
to the extent that we turn a guilty man 
free simply "because the constable may 
have blundered." 
PETERSON v. CONTINEN 
Cite as 4 
From what has been said above, there 
is absolutely no merit to this claim. By 
being in control of an automobile while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
the defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor 
which was in the presence of the officer, 
and the officer had a right and a duty to 
arrest him.2 
The defendant was found guilty in the 
court below of being in actual physical 
control of his truck while he was under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. He 
does not dispute that he was drunk. If the 
statute is good, we should not attempt to 
overrule the trier of the facts and find 
that the defendant was not the one actual-
ly controlling his truck. 
I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
25 Utah 2d 408 
Irene A. PETERSON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, a 
corporation, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 12187. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 29, 1971. 
Appeal by insurer from judgment of 
the Sixth District Court, Sevier County, 
Ferdinand Erickson, J., holding that de-
ceased was covered by accident policy. 
The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that 
where farmer was working about idling 
farm tractor located on his private proper-
ty and it rolled forward and crushed him, 
he was "pedestrian" within policy covering 
injury "sustained in consequence of being 
struck by any land conveyance while a pe-
destrian." 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
&L CASUALTY COMPANY Utah 4 4 5 
P.2d 445 
1. Insurance <&»452 
Person on foot does not cease to be 
"pedestrian" within policy covering inju-
ries sustained while a pedestrian merely 
because he is not in motion. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Insurance <§=»452 
Where farmer was working about 
idling farm tractor located on his private 
property and it rolled forward and crushed 
him, he was "pedestrian" within policy 
covering injury "sustained in consequence 
of being struck by any land conveyance 
while a pedestrian." 
Thomas S. Taylor, of Christensen, Tay-
lor & Moody, Provo, for defendant-appel-
lant. 
Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen & Chamberlain, 
Richfield, for plaintiff-respondent. 
HENRIOD, Justice: 
Appeal from what was labeled a summa-
ry judgment for plaintiff which actually 
was a judgment on all available facts, un-
der, an insurance policy covering injury 
"sustained in consequence of being struck 
by any land conveyance while a pedestri-
an" Affirmed, with costs to plaintiff. 
Believable evidence elicited under the 
discovery process indicates that plaintiff's 
farmer husband was crushed by a tractor 
that, driverless, had rolled down a rise, all 
of which occurred on his private property. 
The only question is whether the de-
ceased was a "pedestrian" under the terms 
of the policy. The trial court said he was, 
—a conclusion with which we agree,—no 
one questioning the fact that the tractor 
was a "land conveyance," and it appearing 
that the vehicle, out of gear, simply trav-
eled downhill as mentioned, and quite ob-
viously ran over the deceased. 
[1,2] Appellant indulges a non sequitur 
by assuming that coverage under the policy 
2. Sec. 77-13-3(1), U.C.A.1953. 
STATE v. KNOEFLER Utah 175 
Cite as 563 P.2d 175 
committed; however, connection of the ac-
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and cused with the crime need not be proved to 
Respondent, establish the corpus delicti. 
v. 
Leslie G. KNOEFLER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14837. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 1, 1977. 
Defendant was convicted before the 
Sixth District Court, Garfield County, Don 
V. Tibbs, J., of driving under the influence 
of intoxicants and inflicting bodily injury 
on another, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Wilkins, J., held that admission or a 
confession without some independent cor-
roborative evidence of the corpus delicti 
cannot alone support a guilty verdict, that 
connection of the accused with the crime 
need not be proven to establish the corpus 
delicti and that evidence, including evidence 
that all three occupants of the automobile 
were injured and that all three smelled of 
alcohol, was sufficient to establish that the 
crimes charged had occurred, independent 
of defendant's admission of having driven 
the automobile at time of the accident. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>409(7), 535(1) 
An admission or a confession, without 
some independent corroborative evidence of 
the corpus delicti, cannot alone support a 
conviction of driving under the influence of 
intoxicants and inflicting bodily injury on 
another. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44(b, d). 
2. Criminal Law <s=>563 
To sustain a conviction, the require-
ment of independent proof of the corpus 
delicti requires only that the State present 
evidence that the injury specified in the 
crime occurred, and that such injury was 
caused by someone's criminal conduct. 
3. Criminal Law to 409(5), 538(3), 563 
An admission or a confession is admissi-
ble to connect an accused with the crime 
4. Automobiles <*=»332 
Injuries resulting from an automobile 
accident are those contemplated by crime of 
driving under the influence of intoxicants 
and inflicting bodily injury on another. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44(b, d). 
5. Criminal Law s=> 409(7) 
Evidence that all three occupants of an 
automobile were injured when it over-
turned, that they all smelled of alcohol, that 
defendant and another were staggering and 
their speech was slurred and that third indi-
vidual was too seriously injured to be 
moved, was sufficient evidence of corpus 
delicti, independent of defendant's admis-
sion of having been the driver, so as to 
support conviction of driving under the in-
fluence of intoxicants and inflicting bodily 
injury on another; admission was corrobo-
rated by independent evidence that a crime 
had occurred. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44(b, d). 
James L. Shumate, Cedar City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F. 
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
David L. Mower, Garfield County Atty., 
Panguitch, for plaintiff and respondent. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of 
driving under the influence of intoxicants 
and inflicting bodily injury on another in 
violation of Utah Code Ann., Sec. 41-6-
44(b) and (d), (1953). The facts reveal that 
defendant and two other individuals, Ste-
vens and Lund, were injured when an auto-
mobile in which they were riding over-
turned near Circleville, Utah, at approxi-
mately 6:15 a.m. on January 28, 1976. The 
defendant and Lund escaped with minor 
bruises and abrasions while Stevens was 
seriously injured. The transcript disclosed 
that there existed "an abundance of beer" 
in the vicinity of the wreckage. Both de-
fendant and Lund were staggering, slurring 
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their speech, and both smelled of alcohol. 
Witnesses to the accident also detected the 
odor of alcohol on Stevens' breath, although 
the serious nature of his injuries made it 
impossible for him to move. While at the 
scene of the accident, defendant admitted 
to an investigating police officer that he 
had been the driver of the automobile at 
the time of the accident. He was then 
placed under arrest and taken to Circleville 
where a breathalyzer test was administered, 
the results of which indicated his blood 
alcohol content to be .21 percent by weight. 
The defendant contends that ihe State at 
the trial below failed to establish the corpus 
delicti (i.e., that a crime had been commit-
ted) independently of his admission that he 
was the driver of the automobile, and he 
therefore seeks reversal of his conviction. 
[1-3] An admission or a confession, 
without some independent corroborative ev-
idence of the corpus delicti, cannot alone 
support a guilty verdict.1 To sustain a con-
viction, the requirement of independent 
proof of the corpus delicti requires only 
that the State present evidence that the 
injury specified in the crime occurred, and 
that such injury was caused by someone's 
criminal conduct.2 An admission or confes-
sion is admissible to connect an accused 
with the crime committed; but the connec-
tion of the accused with the crime need not 
be proven to establish the corpus delicti.3 
[4,5] The State produced evidence of 
the corpus delicti—that the crime of driving 
under the influence of intoxicants and in-
flicting bodily injury on another had oc-
curred—independent of the defendant's ad-
mission of having driven the automobile at 
the time of the accident. The evidence 
1. State v Envin, 101 Utah 365, 387, 120 P 2d 
285 (1942), State v Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 
P 2d 1010 (1938); State v Jessup, 98 Utah 482, 
487, 100 P.2d 969 (1970) 
2. State v. Johnson, Id., 95 Utah at 580, 83 P 2d 
1010. State v. Cazier, Utah, 521 P2d 554, 555 
(1974). McCormick, Evidence (2nd. Ed. 1972) 
Sec. 158, states' "To establish guilt, it is gener-
ally necessary for the prosecution to show that 
(a) the injury of harm specified in the crime 
occurred, (b) this injury or harm was caused bv 
someone's criminal activity, and (c) the defend-
ant was the guilty party. To sustain a convic-
clearly disclosed that all three occupants of 
the automobile were injured, one of them 
quite seriously. Injuries resulting from an 
automobile accident are those contemplated 
by the crime herein involved.4 All three 
occupants of the vehicle smelled of alcohol; 
there was evidence of "an abundance of 
beer" surrounding the wreckage; and the 
defendant and Lund were staggering and 
slurring their speech. One of the three 
occupants had to be the driver, and with 
evidence that all three had been drinking, 
there was a showing that the injuries suf-
fered were a result of someone's criminal 
conduct of driving under the influence of 
intoxicants.5 Consequently, the defendant's 
conviction is not subject to reversal since 
his admission was corroborated by indepen-
dent evidence that a crime had occurred. 
The effect of the defendant's admission was 
to connect him to the crime, and his admis-
sion was not needed to establish that a 
crime had been committed. 
Affirmed. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, MAU-
GHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. 
O I KEYNUMBERSVSTEM 
tion, the requirement of independent proof of 
the corpus delicti demands only that the prose-
cution have introduced independent evidence 
tending to show (a) and (b) It is not necessary 
that the independent proof tend to connect the 
defendant with the crime " 
3. Ibid. 
4. Utah Code Ann, Sec 41-6-44(d), (1953) 
5. Utah Code Ann., Sec. 41~6-44(b), (1953). 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
STATE v. TUCKER Utah 313 
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evidence at trial only for lack of founda-
tion, and thus, such ch'mf could not be 
considered on appeal. 
v. 
Paul Brian TUCKER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 19281. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 11, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. 
Wilkinson, J., of aggravated robbery, and 
he appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmer-
man, J., held that: (1) defendant's claim 
that initial show-up identification was so 
fraught with potential for misidentification 
as to make resulting identification unrelia-
ble and inadmissible, which was not raised 
at trial, would not be considered on appeal; 
(2) even if prosecutor's remarks during 
closing argument were an impermissible 
comment on defendant's exercise of his 
right to remain silent, any error did not 
require reversal; and (3) defendant was not 
entitled to cautionary jury instruction con-
cerning reliability of witness testimony. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
1. Criminal Law <S=>1036.1(7) 
Supreme Court would not consider de-
fendant's claim that initial show-up identifi-
cation at place where defendant was ap-
prehended made resulting identification 
unreliable and its admission violative of 
due process, absent any indication in record 
that defense counsel raised such issue at 
trial. Rules of Evid., Rules 4, 103(a); U.S. 
C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>1036.1(7) 
Defendant's contention that evidence 
of his identification by victim at lineup held 
one month after robbery should have been 
excluded because lineup was tainted by 
earlier suggestive showup was not raised 
at trial, since defendant objected to such 
3. Criminal Law <S=>1030(1) 
Under contemporaneous objection rule, 
if trial court objection does not direct the 
court's attention to legal point being raised 
on appeal, the Supreme Court cannot con-
sider such* point for first time on appeal. 
4. Criminal Law <3=>723(3) 
For statement by prosecutor to be an 
unconstitutional comment on defendant's 
exercise of his right not to take the stand, 
remark must be manifestly intended or of 
such character that jury would naturally 
and necessarily construe it to amount to a 
comment on failure of accused to testify. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
5. Criminal Law <£=>1165(1) 
Conviction will not be reversed unless 
error is something substantial and preju-
dicial in the sense that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would 
have been a different result. U.C.A.1953, 
77-35-30. 
6. Criminal Law &*l 171.5 
Even if prosecutor's remarks during 
closing argument were an impermissible 
comment on defendant's exercise of his 
right to remain silent, any error did not 
require reversal, since alleged misconduct 
was not repetitive or intentional, evidence 
of defendant's guilt was convincing, and 
prompt objections prevented prosecutor 
from making any real point of defendant's 
failure to testify. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-30; 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5. 
7. Criminal Law <3=>785(1) 
Trial court's refusal to give cautionary 
jury instruction concerning reliability of 
eyewitness testimony was not error, since 
jury was adequately instructed on elements 
of offense, burden of proof, and its role in 
assessing credibility of witnesses. 
James C. Bradshaw, Frances Palacios, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
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David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Dave B. 
Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert L. 
Stott, Co. Atty, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and respondent. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a conviction of 
aggravated robbery under U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 76-6-302 (1978 ed.). Defendant chal-
lenges his conviction on grounds that he 
was identified by the victim as a result of 
an improperly suggestive showup and line-
up, that the prosecutor's closing argument 
constituted impermissible comment on his 
failure to take the stand, and that the trial 
court erred in refusing to give a cautionary 
Telfaire-tyye instruction regarding the eye-
witness identification of defendant. We re-
ject these claims and affirm. 
Early in the morning of February 18, 
1983, two men were returning to their 
rooms at the Little America Motel at 5th 
South and Main Street in Salt Lake City, 
when one of them heard a noise behind 
them. While his companion continued 
walking down the street, he turned around 
and was confronted by a man pointing a 
small handgun and wearing a bandana that 
covered the lower part of his face. The 
man demanded all of the victim's money. 
He complied, handing over about $21, and 
then watched as the robber quickly ran 
down 5th South, where the victim glimpsed 
a police car. The car, occupied by two Salt 
Lake County sheriffs deputies, swerved to 
avoid hitting the fleeing robber. Although 
neither deputy had seen the robbery, they 
both thought the man's conduct was suspi-
cious. While one officer parked the car, 
the other pursued the man on foot, losing 
sight of him when he ran down a nearby 
alley. At about the same time, a Salt Lake 
City police department vice squad officer 
happened by and joined in the pursuit. The 
vice officer chased the man down the alley 
and briefly lost sight of him, but continued 
on in the same direction until he reached a 
vacant lot. He scanned the lot with his 
1. The instant case was tried before September 1, 
1983, the effective date of the amended rules of 
evidence. We therefore need not consider the 
impact of the plain error exception in new Rule 
flashlight and discovered defendant, who 
ducked when the light struck him. The 
vice officer drew his revolver, announced 
that he was a police officer, and then de-
tained defendant, who was dressed very 
much like the man the officer had been 
chasing. According to the vice officer, at 
the time of apprehension defendant was 
sweating profusely and had a rapid pulse. 
The vice officer turned defendant over to 
the Salt Lake County police officers. A 
search of defendant produced a bandana 
with a knot in it and about $21, while a 
search of the area through which the chase 
had taken place turned up a small handgun 
matching the description given by the vic-
tim. The victim and his companion, who 
had gone back to the motel after the rob-
bery and summoned the police, were 
brought to the area by the police. Both 
men immediately identified defendant as 
the man who had committed the robbery. 
Approximately three weeks later, the vic-
tim again identified defendant as the rob-
ber by picking him from an eight-man line-
up. 
[1] Defendant's first contention is that 
the initial showup in the vacant lot where 
he was apprehended was conducted under 
circumstances so fraught with potential for 
misidentification as to make the resulting 
identification unreliable and its admission 
violative of due process. See Neil v. Big-
gers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 
381-83, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); State v. 
McCumbtr, Utah, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (1980). 
We do not reach this issue because there is 
no indication in the record that defense 
counsel ever raised it below. Under such 
circumstances, we will not consider an ob-
jection raised for the first time on appeal. 
See Rule 4, Utah R.Evid.; State v. McCar-
dell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945-47 (1982).1 
[2] Defendant next argues that evi-
dence of his identification by the victim at 
the lineup held one month after the rob-
103(a) on the contemporaneous objection rule 
incorporated in Rule 4 or on the -easomng of 
McCardell. 
STATE v. 
Cite as 709 P.2d 
bery should have been excluded. Relying 
on Neil v. Biggers, defendant contends that 
the lineup was tainted by the earlier sug-
gestive showup. Again, we must reject 
defendant's claim because it was not raised 
at trial. 
[3] During the trial, defendant's coun-
sel objected to the victim's testimony about 
the lineup "for foundation" and requested 
an off-the-record conference at the bench. 
Because the request was granted, no 
record exists as to the content of that ob-
jection. All the record reveals is that the 
court subsequently overruled it. After the 
jury was dismissed, defendant's counsel re-
iterated her objection on the record, stating 
that "there was no foundation laid as to the 
fairness and impartiality of that lineup in 
terms of the people who were in the lineup 
along with the defendant." On appeal, de-
fendant's counsel does not contend that 
there were any foundational problems with 
the lineup. Instead, she alleges that the 
Neil v. Biggers due process argument ap-
plies—that because of the defective show-
up, the lineup was fraught with potential 
for misidentification. We have no record, 
however, of this objection being made be-
low and must conclude, therefore, that the 
trial court's attention was never called to 
it. Under the contemporaneous objection 
rule, if the trial court objection does not 
"direct the court's attention" to the legal 
point being raised on appeal, we cannot 
consider it for the first time on appeal. 
652 P.2d at 947. 
[4] The third claim is that the prosecu-
tor's closing argument constituted imper-
missible comment on defendant's exercise 
of his fifth amendment right not to take 
the stand. For a statement by a prosecu-
tor to be constitutional error his remark 
must be " 'manifestly intended or . . . of 
such character that a jury would naturally 
and necessarily construe it to amount to a 
comment on the failure of the accused to 
testify.'" State IK Nomeland, Utah, 581 
P.2d 1010, 1011 (1978), quoting State v. 
Jefferson, 116 R.I. 124, 137, 353 A.2d 190, 
198 (1976); accord, State v. Hales, Utah, 
652 P.2d 1290, 1291-92 (1982). In the 
TUCKEti Utah 315 
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present case, we do not find that constitu-
tional error of reversible dimension oc-
curred. During closing argument, the fol-
lowing colloquy took place: 
Mr. Stott (prosecutor): She tells you that 
the reason the defendant was sweating, 
[sic] because a gun was pointed at him. 
She doesn't tell us why he was in the 
field hiding, does she? 
Ms. Carter (defender): Your Honor, I am 
going to object to that. 
Mr. Stott: Also— 
Ms. Carter: The defense has no burden 
to put on any evidence of anything. 
Mr. Stott: I didn't say what the defense 
was. I said she didn't say— 
The Court: Counsel, let's complete this 
case. Let me make the statement, of 
course, that the burden is on the State to 
prove the case. The defendant does not 
have a burden of proving his innocence. 
Mr. Stott: Thank you. She didn't tell 
you, did she, why he was on that— 
Ms. Carter: Your Honor, I am going to 
object. 
The Court: Counsel, I would again ad-
monish the jury and admonish you also 
that the State, the defendant does not 
have the responsibility of proving his in-
nocence. The burden is on the State to 
prove the guilt. 
At this point, the prosecutor continued with 
his summation, but made no further refer-
ence to the failure of defense counsel to 
explain defendant's actions. 
This exchange does not appear to display 
an intention by the prosecutor to comment 
on the failure of defendant to take the 
stand. Rather, we think that the prosecu-
tor simply was careless in choosing his 
words. He appears not to have even real-
ized that his remarks could be construed as 
a comment on defendant's failure to testi-
fy, since he persisted without apparent 
guile after the judge first admonished the 
jury that defendant had no burden to carry. 
But even assuming that the remarks did, in 
fact, constitute impermissible comment and 
that the jury so understood them, we do 
not find that the error requires reversal. 
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[5,6] Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provides that 4<[a]riy er-
ror, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a 
party shall be disregarded." U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 77-35-30 (1982 ed.). We will not reverse 
a conviction unless the error " 'is some-
thing substantial and prejudicial in the 
sense that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that in its absence there would have been a 
different result/ " State v. Hutchinson, 
Utah, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (1982), quoting 
State v. Unas, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 
(1980); accord State v. Fontana, Utah, 680 
P.2d 1042, 1048 (1984). Considering all of 
the circumstances, there was no reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been 
different had the prosecutor not made the 
improper comments. This is not a case 
where the prosecutorial misconduct was re-
petitive or intentional, as in State v. Wis-
well, Utah, 639 P.2d 146 (1981). Nor is it 
one where the evidence of guilt was mar-
ginal. All the eyewitness identifications 
were certain and unwaivering, and the cir-
cumstantial evidence was convincing. Fi-
nally, defense counsel's prompt objections 
prevented the prosecutor from making any 
real point of the failure to testify, and the 
trial judge's quick and decisive admonition 
to the jury and prosecutor further obviated 
any harm that mi^ht have resulted from 
the comments. See State v. Kazda, Utah, 
540 P.2d 949, 952-53 (1975) (Maughan, J., 
concurring). 
[7] The final claim is that the trial court 
erred in refusing to give a cautionary jury 
instruction concerning the reliability of the 
eyewitness testimony. The proposed in-
struction closely followed that recom-
mended in United States v. Telfaire, 469 
F.2d 552 (D.C.Cir.1972). We have recog-
nized that under suitable circumstances a 
cautionary instruction of the type request-
ed would be required. However, the ques-
tion of whether such an instruction is re-
quired in a particular case has been left to 
the discretion of the trial courts. State v. 
Reedy, Utah, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252 (1984); 
State v. Newton, Utah, 681 P.2d 833, 834 
(1984); State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 
56, 61-62 (1982); State v. Schaffer, Utah, 
638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1981). Considering 
the factors discussed in State v. Reedy, 
supra, at 1254, we conclude that the refus-
al to give such an instruction here was not 
error. We also note that in accordance 
with State v. Schaffer, the trial court ade-
quately instructed the jury on the elements 
of the offense, the prosecution's burden of 
proof, and the jury's role in assessing the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
The conviction is affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE and DURHAM, 
JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result 
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Gary L. FOX, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
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v. 
Clive FOX, Defendant and Appellant. 
Nos. 20088, 20089. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 18, 1985. 
Defendants were convicted in the Sec-
ond District Court, Weber County, David 
E, Roth, J., of possession with intent to 
distribute and production of a controlled 
substance, and they appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) 
evidence was sufficient to support first de-
fendant's convictions for production of con-
trolled substance and possession of mari-
juana with intent to distribute; evidence 
indicated 
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